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BIASES BEHIND SEXUAL ASSAULT:  
A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT SOLUTION TO  
UNDER-ENFORCEMENT OF THE RAPE OF BLACK 
WOMEN 
 
REEMA SOOD* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Devaluation of Black women’s bodies derives from the long his-
tory of slavery in this country.1 The treatment of Black women, from 
slavery to the present, ties closely to the systemic tactics of oppression 
utilized by White slave owners after our country’s founding.2 In remov-
ing autonomy and control over Black female slaves’ bodies, slave own-
ers ensured that any offspring borne from the rape of a Black slave 
would become indoctrinated into slavery.3 Though Congress provided 
options to remedy the unconscionable, disparate treatment of the races 
by passing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion,4 the broad “badges and incidents” of slavery persist,5 coloring the 
treatment of Black women many years after abolition.  
 
Sexual assault deeply affects victims, changing their lives for-
ever. Scholars have written that rape “breaks the spirit, humiliates, 
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We stand together. 
1 See infra Part II. 
2 See infra Part II-A. 
3 Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Pros-
ecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2006).   
4 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 431–32 (1968) (discussing Senator Trum-
bull’s desire to pass a more “sweeping and efficient” bill after the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, specifically one to “give[s] effect” to the declaration that all persons should be 
free) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
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tames, [and] produces a docile, deferential, obedient soul.”6 Rape de-
grades,7 oppresses,8 and instills fear.9 It does not relent, as the lingering 
effects of rape remain in a victim’s life: “resolution of the trauma is 
never final; recovery is never complete.”10 Rape also affects more than 
just the victim: It ripples out to entire communities.11 Victims of rape 
struggle to heal after the trauma and their connected circles of family 
and friends suffer with them.12 
 
Today, sexual assault crimes pose a great threat to the safety and 
well-being of Black women. Police and prosecutors both have signifi-
cant discretionary powers to investigate these crimes.13 Unfortunately, 
implicit, unconscious biases plague our criminal justice system and in 
turn adversely affect law enforcement’s handling of sexual assault 
crimes.14 Black women in particular suffer the consequences of law en-
forcement’s discretionary power15 and have historically been victimized 
by law enforcement.16 Crimes against Black women are poorly 
                                                          
6 SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CONFRONTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN NATIVE 
AMERICA 11 (2015) (quoting Claudia Card, Rape as a Weapon of War, 11 HYPATIA 5, 6 (1996)). 
7 Id. 
8 See BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 18 (1981) (“Rape was a 
common method of torture slavers used to subdue recalcitrant black women.”); Jeffrey J. Poko-
rak, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing the “undervaluation of all rape offenses against Black 
women”). 
9 ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 7 (Duke 
Univ. Press 2015) (2005) (“Rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation 
by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.”) (quoting SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST 
OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15 (Fawcett Books 1993) (1975)).  
10 DEER, supra note 6, at 12 (quoting JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE 
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE – FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 211 (Basic Books 
1992). 
11 Id. at 109. 
12 Id. at 10. 
13 Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 13, 15 (1998). 
14 Id. at 16 (“At every step of the criminal process, there is evidence that African Americans are 
not treated as well as whites – both as victims of crime and as criminal defendants.”). See Poko-
rak, supra note 3, at 40 (discussing the “serious impact on the nature of prosecution” juror biases 
and stereotypes have on prosecutorial discretion because of the “prosecutors’ downstream ori-
entation and system outcome bias”).   
15 See Michelle S. Jacobs, The Violent State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against Police 
Violence, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 39, 41 (2017) (“Black women’s interaction with the 
state, through law enforcement, is marked by violence.”). 
16 See generally ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK 
WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017) (offering a detailed examination of police violence 
against Black women and LGBTQ people of color). 
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investigated and sometimes ignored altogether.17 When police actually 
attempt to investigate alleged crimes against Black women, they often 
believe the victims are not credible.18 Further, the few sexual assault 
crimes that actually lead to police charges are frequently not pursued by 
prosecutors.19 Whether the disparity arises from unconscious or inten-
tional biases, it inflicts harm on Black women by denying them access 
to justice. 
 
Part II traces the history of this country’s degradation of Black 
women’s bodies and assesses how historical abuses continue to shape 
the experiences of Black women with respect to the full enjoyment of 
their rights as enshrined in the Thirteenth Amendment,20 the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.21 Part III outlines the Thirteenth 
Amendment22 as the best method for addressing oppression23 and con-
trol over Black bodies because of the Amendment’s historical ground-
ing and its unburdened status compared to the Fourteenth Amendment.24 
It further connects the Thirteenth Amendment with the history of de-
priving Black women the fundamental human right to bodily auton-
omy.25 Part III-C addresses the seminal Supreme Court decisions that 
initially limited the viability of Thirteenth Amendment arguments, in-
cluding the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson.26 Part III-D out-
lines the Amendment’s practical implementation and resurrection in the 
courts, making particular use of the 1968 decision Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer, Co.27 to show how critical the Amendment can be in the fight to 
protect the lives, safety, and rights of Black women.28 Part IV presents 
potential remedies, including: (1) a call to action for practicing attorneys 
to implement Thirteenth Amendment arguments and increase their 
                                                          
17 See RITCHIE, supra note 16; Kali Holloway, When You’re a Black Woman, You’re Never 
Good Enough to Be a Victim, JEZEBEL (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:40 PM), https://jezebel.com/when-
youre-a-black-woman-youre-never-good-enough-to-be-1633065554 (“For black women who 
are raped, misogyny and racism often conspire to make victim an unattainable status.”).  
18 Jacobs, supra note 15, at 49 (discussing the legal system’s “unwillingness to find Black 
women credible”). 
19 Davis, supra note 13, at 15–16. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
21 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (1991)); see infra Part II.  
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
23 See Douglas L. Colbert, Affirming the Thirteenth Amendment, 1995 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 403, 403 (1995). 
24 See infra Part III. 
25 Id. 
26 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
27 329 U.S. 409 (1968). 
28 See infra Part III-D. 
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prominence in jurisprudence, (2) options for Congress to create laws 
intended to resolve discriminatory treatment of sexual violence against 
Black women, and (3) the option for Black women to seek civil tort 
actions as a means of redress.29 
 
II.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE  
DEVALUATION OF BLACK WOMEN 
A. Rape as a Tool to Dehumanize Black Slaves 
To adequately understand the plight of Black women in our pre-
sent-day context, we must pay particular attention to the way that Black 
women were treated during slavery.30 Although our society, as well as 
our judicial system, seeks comfort in the false premise that it achieved 
fairness and equal opportunity with the abolition of slavery,31 the vile 
constriction of the institution persists through intentional and uninten-
tional biases against Black women.  
 
White slave owners’ treatment of Black slaves had few bounda-
ries.32 In fact, for much of history, raping a Black woman was not crim-
inalized.33 Masters raped and brutalized Black women without any legal 
recompense, furthering their own economic interests by increasing their 
number of slaves as the women gave birth to children of forcible rape.34 
One slave recounted: 
He told me I was his property, that I must be subject to 
his will in all things . . . . No matter whether the slave 
girl be as black as ebony or as fair as her mistress, in 
either case there is no shadow of law to protect her from 
insult, violence, or even death.35 
 
                                                          
29 See infra Part IV. 
30 See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Pro-
filing, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  18, 20 (2004) (discussing racial profiling as a product of 
slavery in the United States). 
31 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Profiling, Terrorism, and Time, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1181, 
1198 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s tendency to “ignor[e] all aspects of American history” 
in the context of racial profiling) (emphasis in original). 
32 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 8–9. 
33 Id. at 6; HOOKS, supra note 8, at 35. 
34 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 10; HOOKS, supra note 8, at 16. 
35 RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 28. 
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Many slave owners had easy access to vulnerable female slaves; 
they frequently forced young Black girls to sleep in the same bedroom 
as themselves.36 Although Black women were attacked and demoralized 
by their White masters, in turn increasing White male power and 
wealth,37 White women failed to assist Black women because some felt 
resentment over their husbands’ attention.38 
 
These repugnant acts to dehumanize Black women continued for 
more than two centuries with a number of false justifications, including 
the lower status of Black people and a false narrative of Black sexual 
promiscuity.39 As further rationalization for their actions, White slave 
owners began to characterize Black women as sexually lascivious and 
lewd.40 Black women were portrayed as so inherently enticing that 
White slave owners could not be held accountable for their actions.41 In 
systematically raping their female slaves, White masters achieved two 
goals: increase their power and dehumanize their property.42 “[T]he 
right claimed by slaveowners . . . over the bodies of female slaves was 
a direct expression of their presumed property rights over Black people 
as a whole.”43  
 
Subjugation hardens and denigrates people.44 The mentality of 
White slave owners created a lasting stereotype of Black women that 
contributes to their disparate treatment.45 The systematic rape of Black 
slaves remains relevant to our present-day understanding of the prob-
lems facing Black women as the biases and judgments embedded them-
selves in modern consciousness.46 
                                                          
36 HOOKS, supra note 8, at 25. 
37 Id. at 16. 
38 Id. at 36. 
39 Id. at 36–37. 
40 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 9. 
41 Id. at 9–10. 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 27–28. 
44 Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves, 13 MASS. 
REV. 81, 98 (1972) (“An intricate and savage web of oppression intruded at every moment into 
the black woman’s life during slavery. Yet a single theme appears at every juncture: the woman 
transcending, refusing, fighting back, asserting herself over and against terrifying obstacles.”); 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, Some Women Won’t ‘Ever Again’ Report a Rape in Bal-
timore, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/us/baltimore-po-
lice-sexual-assault-gender-bias.html. 
45 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 53. 
46 Michelle S. Jacobs, 2018 Special Issue: Enhancing Women’s Effect on law Enforcement in 
the Age of Police and Protest: The Violence State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against 
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Dred Scott v. Sandford serves as the quintessential starting point 
for an in-depth analysis of the disparate treatment of Black women in 
sexual assault crimes.47 Dred Scott, widely condemned as an anti-ca-
nonical case,48 cemented racist public sentiment in the law and sent a 
firm message that Black people were an “inferior class of beings” to 
Whites.49 According to the Court, Black people historically had “no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect.”50 The decision, tac-
tically written by Justice Roger B. Taney and cloaked in an originalist 
interpretation of the meaning of the word “citizen” in the Constitution,51 
further institutionalized racist ideology. The opinion ignored the unique 
experience of Black women and discussed the status of the Black race.52 
Still, the Court denied Black women personhood, increasing the severity 
of their historical oppression.53 The effect of Dred Scott persists in the 
unfair treatment of Black women as they still struggle to obtain person-
hood.54 Lawyers have an obligation to work to correct the bitter dregs 
of Dred Scott55 and provide Black women with the security in their own 
person promised to every person in this country.56  
 
 Although White male assault on Black females critically im-
pacted their experience throughout history, Black women also faced 
subjugation by Black men.57 The rape of Black women by other slaves 
                                                          
Police Violence, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 39, 46–47, 51–52, 63–64 
(2018). 
47 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
48 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 49, 76 (2006) (“Dred Scott is the key example in [the] anti-canon.”). 
49 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 405. 
50 Id. at 407. 
51 Id. at 406–07. 
52 Id. 
53 A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 38–39 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978). 
54 Patricia A. Broussard, Black Women’s Post-Slavery Silence Syndrome: A Twenty-First 
Century Remnant of Slavery, Jim Crow, and Systematic Racism – Who Will Tell Her Stories?, 
16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 401–02, 420–21 (2013) (explaining Black women’s struggle 
to obtain personhood). 
55 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393. 
56 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 (1991)) (providing that citizens of “every race and color” shall have the same right to the 
“full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property”).   
57 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 8; HOOKS, supra note 8, at 35 (citing EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, 
JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 33 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972) (“Even when a 
black man sexually attacked a black woman, he could only be punished by his master, no way 
existed to bring him to trial or to convict him if so brought.”).  
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was not criminalized.58 In George v. State of Mississippi,59 the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi overturned a rape conviction of a Black male slave 
and held that he could not be guilty of raping a Black female slave be-
cause it was not illegal.60 At that time, a male slave could only commit 
rape of White women.61 As an unfortunate consequence of decisions 
like Dred Scott and George, the legality of the assault of Black 
women,62 along with the skewed justifications for assault,63 persist in 
today’s society as unconscious and unintentional biases that color how 
the public views rape crimes against Black women.64 
 
B. Congressional Debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 
 
The Congressional Debates regarding the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act (the “Act”) provide critical context 
for understanding the broad scope interpretation of the Amendment.65 
Referencing the debates, Justice Stewart once stated that the 34th Con-
gress intended for the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to be 
broad and sweeping.66 Congress passed the Act as the first exercise of 
its Thirteenth Amendment, § 2 power.67 Illinois Senator Lyman Trum-
bull, a strong proponent of the broad interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, asserted that the Act strived to “break down all discrimi-
nation between black men and white men.”68 Further, Senator Trumbull 
believed that additional laws needed to be passed to stop the apparent 
problem of public biases furthering the oppression of Black people.69 
The 34th Congress intended the Act to forbid several forms of racial 
discrimination.70  
 
                                                          
58 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 8. 
59 George v. State, 37 Miss. 316 (Miss. Ct. App. 1859). 
60 Id. at 317, 320. See Erin Edmonds, Mapping the Terrain of Our Resistance: A White Feminist 
Perspective on the Enforcement of Rape Law, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 43, 49 (1992) (“The 
rape of a Black woman by any man was not a crime.”). 
61 HOOKS, supra note 8, at 35 (citing EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD 
THE SLAVES MADE 33 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972)).  
62 Id. at 35. 
63 Id. at 16. 
64 See infra Section II-C for a discussion on the modern treatment of Black women. 
65 Carter, supra note 30, at 72. 
66 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 429 (1968). 
67 Colbert, supra note 23, at 404. 
68 Jones, 392 U.S. at 432. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 435. 
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The Thirteenth Amendment allowed Congress to pass the Act.71 
The Amendment presents a powerful implement to address sexual vio-
lence against Black women because it allows Congress to identify lin-
gering effects of slavery and enact legislation to remedy those effects.72 
The broad language and scope of the Act provides an example of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s power.73 The Amendment was intended to 
guarantee freedom,74 not in a restrictive sense limited to freedom from 
slavery, but instead in a broad sense that addressed all vestiges of slav-
ery.75 At the time of enactment, members of Congress held the view that 
the Act should be interpreted broadly.76 Congressional debates on the 
Thirteenth Amendment showed vast support for the use of the Thir-
teenth Amendment to address systemic, ongoing inequities stemming 
from slavery.77  
 
Many pro-slavery citizens reacted poorly to the progressive 
changes of Congress in 1865, unwilling to allow former slaves to enjoy 
equal status under the law.78 Nonetheless, drafters and supporters of the 
Amendment viewed it as necessary because the abolition of slavery 
could not alone create true equality among the races.79 This framing of 
the Thirteenth Amendment provides ample understanding of its in-
tended use. Congress planned for a Constitutional provision that had the 
power to address any incidents or vestiges of slavery.80 With such wide 
reach, the Thirteenth Amendment remains a powerful and “under-uti-
lized”81 remedy, including against the institutionalized dismissal of sex-
ual assault crimes against Black women. 
 
C. Present-Day Issue: Under-Policing and Under-Prosecution of 
Sexual Assault Crimes Against Black Women 
 
                                                          
71 See U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the “power to enforce” the abolition of 
slavery by “appropriate legislation”). 
72 See Carter, supra note 30, at 20 (noting that the Supreme Court has “long recognized that the 
Thirteenth Amendment” is meant to be used to “eliminate the lingering effects of the slave sys-
tem”). 
73 Jones, 392 U.S. at 426–27. 
74 Colbert, supra note 23, at 403. 
75 Carter, supra note 30, at 48.  
76 Id. 
77 Jones, 392 U.S. at 431. 
78 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 16. 
79 Id. at 17. 
80 Jones, 392 U.S. at 429. 
81 Colbert, supra note 23, at 405. 
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  The hyper-sexualized stereotype of Black women that began 
during slavery82 continues to exist and affects Black women’s person-
hood. The self-assuring rationale used to justify White slave owners’ 
systematic subjugation of Black women remains a modern-day ves-
tige.83 Further, Black women sit at the intersection of their race and gen-
der, subject to “overlapping systems of subordination.”84 As a result, 
Black women have not historically been granted the same level of atten-
tion that White women have received following sexual assaults.85 Public 
perception of race and rape can affect the extent of police investiga-
tions.86 Statistics regarding the rape of Black women are flawed due to 
low rates of reporting,87 but existing statistics are revealing. The U.S. 
Department of Justice released a report in 2013 compiling rape statistics 
that showed Black women suffered from attacks at a rate of 2.8 per 1000 
whereas White women were attacked at a rate of 2.2 per 1000.88  
 
Although the existing statistics reflect a slight disparity,89 they 
are difficult to rely upon due to severe issues with underreporting.90 In 
some cases, low reporting may result from a distrust of police.91 Many 
                                                          
82 HOOKS, supra note 8, at 36–37; Pokorak, supra note 3, at 9. 
83 See Pokorak, supra note 3, at 10 (detailing the justifications used by slave owners to abuse 
Black women).   
84 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244, 1265 (1991). In her piece, Crenshaw 
offers the example of the Central Park jogger, a White woman who was sexually assaulted in 
1989. Other rapes occurred in the same week in New York, including a violent gang rape of a 
Black woman. While the Central Park jogger splashed headlines, women of color were not 
granted the same level of the public’s sympathy. Id. at 1268.  
85 Id. at 1268. 
86 See e.g. Toni Irving, Decoding Black Women: Policing Practices and Rape Prosecution on 
the Streets of Philadelphia, 20 NWSA J. 100 (2008) (discussing how black women are “gener-
ally displaced as victims of rape” and examining the way “personal narratives of rape victims 
are structured by competing and overwhelming sociolegal narratives that undercut their recep-
tion”); Vicki McNickle Rose & Susan Carol Randall, The Impact of Investigator Perceptions of 
Victim Legitimacy on the Processing of Rape/Sexual Assault Cases, 5 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 
23 (1982) (examining the “interpretive process in which police investigators engage as they 
construct certain types of victim and case characterizations”). 
87 See Callie Marie Rennison, Rape and Sexual Assault: Reporting to Police and Medical Atten-
tion, 1992-2000, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2 (2002), https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf (“Most rapes and sexual assaults were not reported to the police.”). 
88 MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 240655, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE, 1994-2010 3 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. Of particular note in the DOJ report is the alarming statistic that American Indian women 
are raped at a rate of 4.5 per 1000 people. Id. The reported statistic is marked as cautionary as 
the statistic is either based on fewer than 10 cases or has a variation above 50%, so the conclu-
sion may not be reliable. Id.  
91 Taslitz, supra note 31, at 1190. 
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Black women struggle to trust police due to a history of unfair treatment, 
including being coerced into sexual favors to avoid criminal charges92 
or even sexually assaulted outright.93 Black women may feel less com-
fortable approaching police officers after being attacked than White 
women, resulting in lower than accurate statistics on total rapes perpe-
trated against Black women.94 
 
In 2015, the Department of Justice concluded a lengthy investi-
gation of Baltimore City for numerous unconstitutional and unaccepta-
ble practices, including grossly inadequate investigation of rape allega-
tions.95 The federal report focused on the Baltimore City Police 
Department and the many instances in which the department derisively 
disregarded forcible rape allegations made by women in the predomi-
nantly African American city.96 In one instance cited in the report, when 
a victim attempted to discuss her case with a Baltimore City police of-
ficer, he challenged her by asking, “Why are you messing that guy’s life 
up?”97 According to the DOJ investigation, the city police officer re-
jected the victim’s claims and focused instead on how the alleged rap-
ist’s life would be affected rather than recognizing the immense diffi-
culties of her attack.98 Another officer in the Baltimore Police 
Department indicated that “all [their] cases were bullshit.”99 In addition 
to the inadequacy of police officers’ investigations, many rape kits sit 
untested, even though they contain evidence gathered through invasive 
physical examinations of victims immediately after traumatic attacks.100 
Of all the rape kits collected, fewer than one fifth actually get tested.101 
                                                          
92 Stolberg & Bidgood, supra note 44. 
93 See generally RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 106–26 (detailing specific instances of sexual vio-
lence perpetrated by police officers against women and LGBTQ people of color). 
94 See id. (discussing why Black women may feel less comfortable approaching police officers). 
See also Taslitz, supra note 31, at 1190 (detailing how 65.8% of Black people indicated they 
had low confidence that police would treat them the same as white people and five times as 
many Black people reported mistreatment at the hand of police officers than White people).   
95 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 122–
27 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download [hereinafter Investigation of the 
Baltimore City Police Department] 
96 Id. at 122 (noting that BPD detectives ask questions “suggesting that they discredit the reports 
of victims who delay” in reporting and display “undue skepticism of reports of sexual assault”); 
Quick Facts: Baltimore city, Maryland (County), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.cen-
sus.gov/quickfacts/baltimorecitymarylandcounty#qf-flag-NA (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (indi-
cating that the percentage of Black people living in Baltimore City is 63%). 
97 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra 
note 95, at 122. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 123–24. 
101 Id. at 124. 
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These rape kits can implicate any number of prior offenders with DNA 
currently in the system or point to new suspects, but city police leave 
them sitting untested.102 The findings by the Department of Justice re-
vealed that the police treated the claims of women in the 63% African 
American city103 as invalid and not credible.104 By simple inference, the 
majority105 of the untested rape kits were collected from Black women 
and went to waste. 
 
Not only did the Department of Justice find the Baltimore City 
Police Department’s investigative practices well below constitutional 
standards, it also cited multiple examples of ineptitude on the part of 
city prosecutors.106 Prosecutors laughed with police officers about 
claims of sexual assault reported by city women.107 In one instance, a 
city prosecutor discussed a case with the arresting officer, complaining 
that he was “not excited about charging it” and that the victim “seemed 
like a conniving little whore.”108 The disregard, disdain, and incredulity 
towards women’s reports of sexual assault in a majority Black city109 
create an almost palpable affirmation that Black women are second class 
citizens, if they are considered citizens at all. The police department’s 
routine under-investigation of sexual assaults110 cripples victims’ ability 
to get justice for serious crimes in a majority Black city and demon-
strates deep ties to the historical treatment of Black women. If society 
harbors the belief that Black women are inherently lustful and incapable 
of being raped,111 then it follows that police officers and prosecutors 
                                                          
102 Id. 
103 See Stolberg and Bidgood, supra note 44; Quick Facts: Baltimore City, Maryland, supra 
note 96. 
104 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra 
note 95, at 122–23. 
105 See Stolberg & Bidgood, supra note 44 (noting that from 2010-2014, rape kits were tested 
in only 15% of Baltimore sexual assault cases). 
106 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra 
note 95, at 122. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 124–25. 
110 See id. at 123 (“[The Baltimore City Police Department] seriously and systematically under-
investigates reports of sexual assault . . . .”). 
111 BARRETT J. FOERSTER, RACE, RAPE, AND INJUSTICE: DOCUMENTING AND CHALLENGING 
DEATH PENALTY CASES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 77 (Michael Meltsner ed., 2012). Although the 
book primarily focuses on the struggle of Black men in their own White rape narrative, it out-
lines a case study in Alabama that proves helpful in understanding the disparate outcomes of 
cases with Black victims. In 1964, seventeen counties in Alabama were surveyed. In 130 rape 
cases with a Black male defendant, the death sentence was used twenty-one times. In sixty-two 
rape cases with White defendants, only one resulted in a death sentence. None of the victims in 
any of the twenty-two cases resulting in death sentences were Black women. In the seventy 
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would also have a hard time believing a Black woman who states she 
was attacked. Police officers would then feel less inclined to investigate 
sexual assault crimes against Black women, leading to unfair outcomes 
in the justice system.112 
 
A particularly disturbing scenario arises when members of law 
enforcement leverage their position of authority to target Black women 
in sexual assaults.113 Daniel Holtzclaw, a part White, part Asian-Amer-
ican police officer from Oklahoma City strategically targeted Black 
women from a low-income neighborhood in a series of sexual as-
saults.114 Mr. Holtzclaw deliberately sought Black women, some with 
criminal backgrounds, who he believed were less likely to receive help 
should they report his despicable actions.115 A victim stated, “I didn’t 
think nobody was going to believe me anyway . . . . I’m a drug ad-
dict.”116 The prosecutor in the case against Mr. Holtzclaw stated, “He 
counted on the fact no one would believe them and no one would 
care.”117 Black women are in the unfortunate and unjust position of be-
ing targeted by attackers who seek to exploit their societal vulnerabili-
ties to avoid prosecution. Moreover, members of the police force, agen-
cies meant to protect and serve the citizens of the United States, know 
that Black women routinely do not receive justice for sexual assault 
crimes perpetrated against them and have, in some shameful cases, used 
that knowledge to orchestrate further victimization.118 Vestiges of slav-
ery persist and Black women are continuously dehumanized through 
both these deliberate actions and through subtle biases. 
 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
                                                          
cases with Black female victims studied, there were no death sentences ordered. Cases involving 
the rape of White women resulted 22-25% of the time in a death sentence. Id. 
112 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra 
note 95, at 122–27.  
113 See generally RITCHIE, supra note 16 (detailing police violence against Black women and 
LGBTQ people). “In the past decade a law enforcement official was caught in a case of sexual 
abuse or misconduct at least every five days.” Id. at 109. 
114 Ben Fenwick & Alan Schwarz, In Rape Case of Oklahoma Officer, Victims Hope Conviction 
Will Aid Cause, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/us/daniel-
holtzclaw-oklahoma-police-rape-case.html. 
115 Dave Philipps, Former Oklahoma City Police Officer Found Guilty of Rapes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/us/former-oklahoma-city-police-of-
ficer-found-guilty-of-rapes.html; see RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 105–08 (discussing the 
Holtzclaw case and its implications). 
116 RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 107 (quoting a victim identified by the initials T.M.). 
117 Philipps, supra note 115. 
118 Id. (noting that Holtzclaw “singl[ed] out poor, black victims with criminal backgrounds 
whose stories would not be believed”). 
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A. The Thirteenth Amendment 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment constitutes a broad method for 
fighting long-held, deeply-rooted injustices against Black people.119 
The Amendment, broken into two sections, states: 
 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.120 
 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this ar-
ticle by appropriate legislation.121 
 
Drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment intended it be used to remedy 
many of the societal maladies left after slavery.122 In fact, Abraham Lin-
coln equated the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to securing and 
safeguarding the rights intended in the Declaration of Independence.123 
The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment,124 the Enabling 
Clause, grants Congress the broad power to create legislation rectifying 
any remaining badges or incidents of slavery.125 This power allows Con-
gress to remedy any ongoing race-based social disparities actualized 
during slavery that inhibit the rights of Black people, including the right 
to be secure in your own person.126  
 
Denying Black women their right to be secure in their own 
person bears a strong connection to the treatment of Black women 
throughout our nation's history.127 Over 150 years after the abolition of 
slavery, Black women continue to be subjected to assault at higher 
                                                          
119 Carter, supra note 30, at 20. 
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
121 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. 
122 See discussion supra Section II-B. 
123 DONALD LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION, RACE, AND RENEWED RELEVANCE OF ORIGINAL INTENT: 
RECLAIMING THE LOST OPPORTUNITY OF FEDERALISM 41 (2008). 
124 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. 
125 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). 
126 See generally id. (recognizing broad Congressional authority to cure race-based social dis-
parities).   
127 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
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rates than White women.128 Congress created the Thirteenth 
Amendment to rectify unjust treatment nurtured by the bonds of 
slavery.129 The Thirteenth Amendment provides an opportunity for 
Congress to repair the ills surrounding slavery130 and the 
disproportionate attack of Black women, maintained throughout the 
centuries, constitutes a surviving malignancy that our judicial system 
needs to resolve. The first legislation passed using Congress’ Enabling 
Clause powers helps one understand the Thirteenth Amendment as an 
option for combating racial injustice.131 Key decisions, including the 
Civil Rights Cases, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 
Co., provide further insight as to how the Thirteenth Amendment 
should be used to aid Black women.132 
 
B. The 1866 Civil Rights Act 
 
The first utilization of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 1866 
Civil Rights Act,133 provides a sound example of the 34th Congress’ 
intentions.134 Presently, the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is 
codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982.135 Of particular significance is 
the phrase contained within both the original Civil Rights Act and § 
1981, “the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person.”136 This section specifies a right intended to be 
protected by the Act: the right to the security of one’s person.137 The 
high rate of sexual assault against Black women stands in direct 
                                                          
128 PLANTY ET AL., supra note 88. 
129 See discussion supra Section II-B. 
130 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
131 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)). 
132 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
133 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 states: “That all persons born in the United States and not 
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of 
the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous 
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts; to sue, be parties and give evidence, 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed 
by white citizens . . . .” Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)). 
134 Colbert, supra note 22, at 404. 
135 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2016). 
136 Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)). 
137 Id. 
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opposition of the “security of the person;” our society denies Black 
women the basic right of having security in their bodies and the 
expectation of safety.138 The plain language of the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 includes this concept of personal security. 
Further, personal security is an extension of Congressional intent, 
especially in light of the Congressional debates focused on the dangers 
to Black citizens.139 As such, it follows that Congress intended for the 
Civil Rights Act to cover the continued abuses of Black women.140  
 
C. Early Supreme Court Decisions 
 
Early Supreme Court decisions following the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment initially limited its appeal and departed from the 
original intent of the legislature.141 Regardless of the Congressional in-
tent for the Amendment,142 the Supreme Court in the mid to late 1800s 
did not view the Thirteenth Amendment as a sweeping tool for remedy-
ing the issues surrounding slavery.143 The limiting opinions in the Civil 
Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson paint the picture of a Court not yet 
willing to act as progressively as the legislature by creating narrow in-
terpretations of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.144 
 
The Civil Rights Cases signified a general acceptance of the the-
oretical power of the Thirteenth Amendment while simultaneously lim-
iting its scope.145 The majority opinion provided that under the Thir-
teenth Amendment, Congress was empowered to pass laws “necessary 
and proper . . . for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its 
badges and incidents.”146 Although on its face, this language seems ben-
eficial for a Thirteenth Amendment argument, the Court drew a narrow 
interpretation of what truly constituted a badge or incident of slavery.147 
For example, the Court would not allow Congress to punish segregated 
                                                          
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1337, 1338 
(2009).    
142 See Carter, supra note 30, at 48 (noting that “both sides” agreed the “goal of the Amendment 
was not limited to the abolition of slavery as an economic institution”). 
143 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 537-538 (1896). 
144 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537-538. 
145 Carter, supra note 29, at 52–53. 
146 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 21; Carter, supra note 30. at 52; Tsesis, supra note 141, at 
1341. 
147 Carter, supra note 30, at 52. 
SOOD  
420 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 18:2 
private businesses.148 However, in light of Congress’ intended applica-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment, it follows that the segregation of 
businesses qualifies as a badge and incident of slavery.149 Unfortu-
nately, because the Court chose to limit its scope, the Civil Rights Cases 
created a judicial limit on how Congress could expect to utilize the Thir-
teenth Amendment.150 Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote a powerful 
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, arguing that Congress should in fact 
pass laws against “deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights 
granted to other freemen in the same State.”151 His position recalled the 
Congressional debates on the Amendment arguing that the majority was 
taking a needlessly restrictive view of the Thirteenth Amendment.152 To 
Justice Harlan, the context surrounding the particular issue bears tre-
mendous weight.153  
 
The Civil Rights Cases exemplify a missed opportunity of the 
Court to prioritize the safety and well-being of Black people. Nonethe-
less, language in the case, particularly the use of the phrases “necessary 
and proper” and “badges and incidents of slavery,”154 continues to add 
validity to Thirteenth Amendment arguments. Luckily, the Court’s op-
pressively limited understanding of what constituted a “badge” of slav-
ery no longer controls in modern jurisprudence.155 Still, the limited in-
terpretation may have had an adverse impact on the capacity of lawyers 
at the time to make compelling Thirteenth Amendment arguments.156 
Narrow interpretations of the Amendment’s scope may have dissuaded 
lawyers across the country from pursuing Thirteenth Amendment argu-
ments due to fears that they would be dismissed by courts.157 Over time, 
this restrictive theory of the Thirteenth Amendment’s power and useful-
ness inhibited the Amendment’s capacity to resolve many of the issues 
that pervaded society following slavery.158 Further, the avoidance of the 
Amendment as a viable argument continues to occlude the minds of 
                                                          
148 Tsesis, supra note 141, at 1341 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24). 
149 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. 
150 Id. at 22; Carter, supra note 30, at 59; Tsesis, supra note 141, at 1338. 
151 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
152 Id.; Tsesis, supra note 141, at 1339. 
153 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 35. 
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155 See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (expanding the scope of 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s application). 
156 See generally Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (majority) (limiting the potential use of 
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legal students and scholars, decreasing the likelihood of its implemen-
tation to fix the many problems it was indeed designed to fix.159 
 
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court again took an unnecessarily 
limited stance on what it considered “badges and incidents” of slav-
ery.160  In Plessy, decided in 1896, a man of 1/8 African and 7/8 Cauca-
sian descent rode on a rail car intended for White people only and re-
fused to move when a train conductor tried to relocate him to a coach 
intended for Black people.161 The issue in Plessy v. Ferguson was 
whether a statute requiring separate but equal railway cars in Louisiana 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.162 The Court held that segregation on rail-
cars was not an issue that Congress had a right to address through the 
Thirteenth Amendment and that the Amendment was only intended to 
abolish slavery and not cover the general issues surrounding slavery.163  
 
The theory of the Thirteenth Amendment underlying the Court’s 
decision had not changed much since the Civil Rights Cases were de-
cided.164 Again, the Court restricted the concept of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to simply constitute an abolition of slavery, rather than the 
broad scope interpretation of the Amendment.165 The Plessy Court re-
jected outright the premise that legislation had the power to resolve so-
cial problems between the races.166 According to the majority opinion, 
“If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be 
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's mer-
its, and a voluntary consent of individuals.”167 The Supreme Court re-
fused to intervene in the relationship between the races and instead felt 
ongoing issues between them should be resolved through mutual devel-
opment and understanding.168  
 
                                                          
159 Colbert, supra note 23, at 411. 
160 Tsesis, supra note 141, at 1342. 
161 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541–42 (1896). 
162 Id. at 542. 
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164 Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)). 
165 Id.; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3–4. 
166 Plessy, 163 at 551. 
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 551–52. 
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This is a fundamentally unsound proposition.169 The Court chose 
to avoid an issue that had already been confronted by the legislature.170 
The Court was not charged with creating a statutory solution but simply 
interpreting the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment as ratified by the 
34th Congress.171 The Plessy Court needed only to heed to Constitu-
tional rule before it. The limited scope theory from the Civil Rights 
Cases survived unchanged in Plessy v. Ferguson.172  This unfortunately 
compounded the limited interpretation and may have dissuaded the pub-
lic from utilizing the Thirteenth Amendment to address broad problems.  
 
Although the limited scope theory of the Thirteenth Amendment 
survived the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy, it was fortunately over-
turned in the critical modern case Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co. in 
1968.173 Jones revived the Thirteenth Amendment’s application in mod-
ern times, offering it as a viable tool to resolve the issue of the under-
prosecution of crimes against Black women.174   
 
D. Revitalization of the Thirteenth Amendment Argument 
 
 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co. reinvigorated the Thirteenth 
Amendment in the modern era.175 Joseph Lee Jones, the Petitioner in the 
case before the Supreme Court, alleged that Alfred H. Mayer, Co. had 
denied him a home in one of its communities, Paddock Woods in Mis-
souri.176 The Court addressed the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 
and whether it could be applied to a situation where a private individual 
refused to sell a home to a Black citizen solely due to his race.177 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have 
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by White cit-
izens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property.”178 Here, the Court primarily focused on property 
rights rather than the security of the person.179 Nonetheless, § 1982 
                                                          
169 Contra id.  
170 Contra id.  
171 Contra id. 
172 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551–52. 
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175 Colbert, supra note 22, at 405. 
176 Jones, 392 U.S. at 412. 
177 Id. at 412–13. 
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law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2016). 
179 Jones, 392 U.S. at 421. 
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enshrines a portion of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and therefore it can be 
viewed as an interpretation with similar foundational footing.180 In de-
termining whether a White man who refused to sell a home to a Black 
man violated the statute, the Court first examined statute’s scope.181 The 
Court reasoned that § 1982 had previously been interpreted in Hurd v. 
Hodge182 as having a broad scope and was not limited to simply allow-
ing Black people to own property.183 Instead, the statute extended to sit-
uations in which individuals were unduly restricted from owning partic-
ular property.184 As such, the Court held that the statute applied to the 
situation Jones faced.185 
 
Opponents of a broad interpretation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment may make the case that the plain language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment indicates it was only intended to end slavery in the United 
States.186 However, that interpretation clearly neglects to consider the 
drafters’ intent.187 Further, Jones makes a strong case against this inter-
pretation of the language of the Thirteenth Amendment.188 In Jones, Jus-
tice Potter Stewart states that if the Thirteenth Amendment were solely 
intended to require the states to abolish slavery, then § 2 of the Amend-
ment, which reads, “Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation,” would be illogical and unnecessary.189 Ac-
cording to Justice Stewart, there would be no need for that section as § 
1 of the Amendment sufficiently abolished slavery.190 Therefore, Con-
gress must have intended for additional legislation to be passed as nec-
essary to resolve the issues surrounding slavery.191  
 
                                                          
180 Id. at 422. 
181 Id. at 417. 
182 334 U.S. 24 (1948). 
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The theory underlying the Thirteenth Amendment shifted with 
Jones back toward Congressional intent for a broad Amendment, creat-
ing an opportunity for an argument advocating for the rights of Black 
women without judicial restriction.192 Jones provides an opportunity to 
finally address the sexual violence perpetrated on Black women.193 
Black women are targeted for sexual assaults and are not receiving con-
stitutionally guaranteed support in the criminal justice system. Under 
the Thirteenth Amendment, one might argue that the modern treatment 
of Black women results from the injustices forced upon them since slav-
ery and push for legislative action aimed at remedying this unfair treat-
ment.194  
 
IV. REMEDIES 
 
Although the situation facing American society regarding the 
disparate treatment in sexual assaults of Black women is immense, a 
few remedies exist. The Thirteenth Amendment and U.S.C. § 1981, 
along with additional laws that should be passed under § 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment provide an opportunity for Congress to embed pro-
tections in legislation.195 Black women can also use civil tort remedies 
to seek out some restitution for these attacks.196 These options establish 
a plan to address the violence against Black women and rectify a painful 
aspect of their historical oppression and devaluation. Nothing can erase 
history and experience, but these options may provide some relief. 
 
A. Legislation 
With the Thirteenth Amendment and the current codification of 
the 1866 Civil Rights Act within 42 U.S.C. § 1981, some protections for 
Black women already exist in legislation.197 These doctrines, already 
enshrined in our current law, allow a sufficient means of pursuing a 
claim based on the immoral under-enforcement of rape of Black 
women.198 Women who have been attacked and who have not had the 
crimes against them adequately investigated should file suit against the 
government asserting that this unfair treatment is in violation of the 
                                                          
192 Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.  
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Thirteenth Amendment, or alternatively, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, created under the powers granted by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.199  
 
In a Thirteenth Amendment argument, outlining the historical 
connection of sexual violence against Black women to slavery incorpo-
rates the background needed for a cohesive front in the mold of Jones.200 
The alternative, or perhaps supplemental, statutory argument for a vio-
lation of the rights included in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should focus on the 
section covering “security of the person,” making the point that Black 
women have fundamentally been denied access to safety and autonomy 
because of the high incidence of sexual violence.201 These arguments 
grant a method of restitution for the plight Black women face regarding 
these crimes.202 By introducing legal arguments grounded in the Thir-
teenth Amendment, attorneys, judges, and legislators will realize the po-
tential for the Amendment to resolve vestiges of slavery. Through per-
sistent application, the Thirteenth Amendment argument can change the 
minds of those who currently feel its sole purpose was to abolish slav-
ery.203  
 
With the confirmations of Supreme Court Justices Neil Gor-
such204 and Brett M. Kavanaugh,205 our nation’s highest court may not 
have the political ideology that would favor a broad interpretation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, an alternative option remains. 
Congress has the power to pass laws under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment206 and should exercise that power by passing legislation that spe-
cifically targets the problem that Black women face. In so doing, Con-
gress would not only establish concrete protection for Black women in 
the form of a statute addressing the under-enforcement of these 
crimes,207 it would also send a message to Black women that this is an 
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issue that our government takes seriously enough to warrant unique leg-
islation. This message may increase the confidence Black women have 
in our criminal justice system,208 leading to increased reporting and im-
proved statistics. Congressional action has a better chance of succeeding 
than cases tried in front of the Supreme Court regarding unequal treat-
ment, especially given the fact that the 2018 mid-term elections resulted 
in Democratic capture of the House of Representatives.209 Further, there 
has been an increased focus on male sexual violence against women 
since President Trump’s election.210 If activists are able to capitalize on 
this political moment, legislation designed to provide Black women 
with additional protections could succeed in Congress. Solidifying leg-
islative support in Congress for the fair treatment of sexual assault cases 
of Black women would prove more fruitful than trying to push cases up 
to the Supreme Court.211 
B. Civil Tort Remedies 
Black women can use civil tort actions to deter sexual violence 
while simultaneously providing themselves with a viable means of re-
dress. Black women could sue perpetrators of sexual assault for tradi-
tional torts like assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and potentially false imprisonment. While no particular legal 
remedy can make a sexual assault survivor whole after their experience, 
civil tort actions can provide a victim with a more viable option than the 
current criminal system.212  
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The criminal system presents several problems to victims who 
are interested in their own individual view of justice.213 The civil system 
also would allow sexual assault survivors more control over their cases, 
whereas the criminal system can sometimes force victims to testify 
against their will in the context of crimes committed against the state.214 
Sexual assault survivors do not necessarily wish to go through the tra-
ditional criminal system, which many view as not representative of their 
own interests.215 The civil system presents a more individualistic re-
sponse,216 wherein victims can choose whether to move forward in fil-
ing a complaint as well as the direction that their case should take.  
 
A potential problem with the civil system alternative is that not 
all perpetrators can pay the damages awarded to the victim, which can 
limit the potential appeal for a civil attorney to take a sexual assault case. 
In order for this option to be viable, lawyers would need to act in part 
as an activist, individually devoted to enacting social change through 
cases that may or may not lead to large awards for damages. In the past, 
lawyers who have been interested in enacting new rape laws and devel-
oping new codes have not necessarily translated into a cohesive “public 
interest bar” on sexual assault issues.217 Attorneys that work on these 
civil cases should be interested in how they can create social change 
while simultaneously helping the individual survivor recover from the 
trauma of assault. 
CONCLUSION 
Black women suffer from sexual violence at a higher rate than 
White women218 because of centuries-old racist biases stemming from 
the institution of slavery, and the United States continues to ignore 
their struggle. The 34th Congress anticipated the numerous injustices 
that would outlast emancipation and passed the Thirteenth Amendment 
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and the 1866 Civil Rights Act with the intention of empowering 
Congress to enact further legislation to protect Black people.219 The 
disparate treatment of Black women subjected to sexual violence 
remains unresolved generations after abolition220 and requires direct 
action. Utilizing the Thirteenth Amendment to its true post-Jones 
potential221 would force the criminal justice system to make the 
necessary changes to provide Black women with the security they have 
long been promised. 
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